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ASSESSING THE IMPACT 
OF THE EMPA'S PARLIAMENTARY 
DIPLOMACY IN INTERNATIONAL 
CONFLICTS: CONTRIBUTION 
OR OBSTACLE? 1 
Stelios STAVRIDIS 2 and Roderick PACE 3 
Abstract 
This chapter analyzes Euro-Mediterranean relations 
from the perspective of their parliamentary angle, and 
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derick Pace, «The EMPA and parliamentary diplomacy in the Medi-
terranean: a preliminary assessment», in Stelios Stavridis, Natividad 
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2 Dr Stavridis is ARAID Senior Research Fellow, Research Unit on 
Global Governance and the European Union, University of Zaragoza. 
E-mail: dr.stelios.stavridis@gmail.com. 
3 Professor Pace is Director of the European Documentation and 
Research Centre of the University of Malta. E-mail address: roderick. 
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in particular from the role that the Euro-Mediterranean 
Parliamentary Assembly plays in the numerous inter-
national conflicts that exist in the region. The chapter's 
main objective is to present an assessment by concen-
trating on three such examples: the Middle East, Cyprus 
and the Western Sahara. The conclusion is that so far 
there has been to a large extent an unproductive near-
obsession with the Palestinian issue, whereas on the 
contrary, there is no interest whatsoever in the other two 
conflicts. The reasons for this are many but the main 
one can be summarized as follows: the external effects 
of the latter two conflicts can more or less be contained. 
Those of the Middle East cannot. It is argued that such a 
poor record is not only due to the intrinsic difficulties of 
the conflicts involved, but also reflects badly on the real 
and potential role that parliamentary diplomacy can and 
should play in conflict resolution. 
INTRODUCTION 
Studies on Euro-Mediterranean relations abound. 
Ever since the initial years of the European integra-
tion process the policies of the then EEC towards the 
Mediterranean have taken a prominent seat4. Following 
the collapse of the Cold War order, the EEC re-created 
itself as the European Union (EU) through the Maas-
tricht Treaty, the first in a long saga of institutional 
treaty reforms culminating in the ratification of the Lis-
bon Treaty in 2009. During this period the EU revised 
and revamped its policies towards the Southern rim 
of the Mediterranean by launching in 1995 the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also known as the 
Barcelona Process 5. However, further enlargements 
4 For a history see Filippos Pierros, Jacob Meunier, Stan Abrams, 
Bridges and Barriers, The European Union's Mediterranean Policy, 
1961-1998, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1999. 
5 Fulvio Attina, Stelios Stavridis (eds.), The Barcelona Process 
and Euro-Mediterranean Issues from Stuttgart to Marseilles, Giuffre, 
Milan, 2001; Haizam Amirah Fernandez, Richard Youngs (eds.), The 
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obliged it to look at its wider policy towards its immedi-
ate neighbourhood: in 2004 it launched the European 
Neighbourhood Policy; and in 2008-2009, following the 
2007 initiative by President Sarkozy, the EU repackaged 
its policy towards the Mare Nostrum into a Union for 
the Mediterranean (UfM) 6. 
Most studies concentrate on the political, econom-
ic and the human rights dimensions of those relations 
and policies and also agree that the record to date is 
rather disappointing to say the least 7. This chapter con-
centrates on a neglected area of academia: relations 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Assessing the First Decade, Elca-
no Royal Institute for International and Strategic Studies and the 
Fundaci6n para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior 
(FRIDE), 2005: www.realinstitutoelcano.org. 
6 ISS Report, Union for the Mediterranean-Building on the Bar-
celona acquis, European Union Institute for Security Studies Report 
n.o 1 (Roberto Aliboni, George Joffe, Erwan Lannon, Azzam Mahjo-
ub, Abdallah Saaf, Alvaro de Vasconcelos), Paris, 13 May 2008; Euro-
mesco, "Putting the Mediterranean Union in Perspective», Euromes-
co Report, n.O 68 (Roberto Aliboni, Ahmed Driss, Tobias Schumacher, 
Alfred Tovias), June 2008: www.euromesco.net; DorotMe Schmid, 
The Union for the Mediterranean: French Track or New European Po-
licy, The Jean Monnet Seminar Series, Malta European Studies As-
sociation & European Documentation Centre, University of Malta, 
2008; Gonzalo Escribano and Alejandro Lorca, ,,"Proceso de Barce-
lona: Uni6n para el Mediterraneo": ,:continuidad 0 ruptura», in Ste-
lios Stavridis, Natividad Fernandez Sola (eds.), Factores politicos y 
de seguridad en el area euro-mediterranea, Prensas Universitarias de 
Zaragoza, Zaragoza, 2009, pp. 57-81; Bichara Khader, «LUnion pour 
la Mediterranee du Sommet de Paris (13 juillet 2008) a la Conference 
de Marseille (3-4 novembre 2008»>, in ibid., pp. 83-109; Special Issue 
on "Union for the Mediterranean: National and Regional Perspectives» 
(Guest editors: Dimitris Xenakis and Panayotis Tsakonas), Etudes 
Helleniques/Hellenic Studies, vol. 17, n.o 2, Autumn, 2009. 
7 Peter Seeberg, "EU and the Mediterranean: Foreign Policy and 
Security», in Peter Seeberg (ed.), EU and the Mediterranean: Foreign 
Policy and Security, University Press of Southern Denmark, Odense, 
2007, pp. 7-37; Stelios Stavridis, "The Barcelona Process, twelve 
years on: a critical overview», Agora without Frontiers - A Quarterly 
Journal of International Economy and Politics, vol. 13, n.O 4, March-
May 2008, pp. 243-261. 
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between parliamentary bodies and parliamentarians. 
There is indeed very little academic interest in the ques-
tion. However, this particular study will not deal with 
the parliamentary dimension of the EMP/UfM as such. 
Instead it will focus on a traditional area of IR interest: 
conflict resolution. It will do so bv assessing the role 
" ~ 
played by the EMPA in conflict resolution by reference 
to three important and enduring international conflicts 
in the Mediterranean: the Middle East, Cyprus, and the 
Western Sahara. 
The chapter is divided into the following parts: the 
Introduction presents an overview of why such a ques-
tion is important in the first place. Part 1 addresses the 
question of the major changes that have occurred in 
the international system and the growing role of par-
liamentary bodies. Part 2 considers how this develop-
ment affects the way parliamentary assemblies can act 
in conflictual situations, be it for conflict prevention or 
conflict resolution. Part 3 presents an overview of how 
the three conflicts mentioned impact on the EMPlUfM. 
Part 4 assesses the EMPA's impact on these three con-
flicts. In it, we try to answer the question of whether the 
EMPA's parliamentary diplomacy to date has helped or 
hindered conflict resolution in the Mediterranean. 
Changes in the International System 
There are a number of reasons why parliaments are 
becoming important international actors. Tremendous 
changes have taken place in the international system in 
the last two decades which provides them with new op-
portunities of playing an important role in international 
affairs. But these changes in the international system 
are full of paradoxes. In 1991, the end of the Cold War 
had prompted President George H. W. Bush to declare 
that «we have before us the opportunity to forge for our-
selves and for future generations a new world order, a 
f..? 
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE EMPAS PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY. .. 
world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, 
governs the conduct of nations» 8. 
And, on what would a world based on the rule of law 
depend if not on parliaments with the power to have 
the last word on what states do in international affairs? 
But despite this optimism of a «new world orden> in 
recent years we have seen a resurgence of global mili-
tary expenditure that surpasses the levels spent in 1988, 
just a year before the Cold War ended. This may be a 
tell-tale sign that while they are less inclined to resort 
to force than they were before, states have not lost their 
appetite for old-fashioned «power politics». According 
to figures provided by the Stockholm Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI), in 2005-2008 the USA's annual mili-
tary expenditure in real terms has surpassed the pre-
Cold War levels (1988)9. 
Hence, while in overall terms most states show a gen-
eral tendency, still admittedly peppered with numerous 
outbursts of violence (e. g. Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Gaza and Georgia), to seek peaceful resolution of con-
flicts, they are preparing for the eventuality that they 
would be forced to resort to war. 
Another trend observable in international relations 
is that the ongoing process of Globalization (itself fa-
cilitated by the growing corpus of international treaties 
and conventions agreed to by states) has led to the crea-
tion of a number of organizations where states and a 
growing number of non-state actors interact in trying 
to govern and manage the whole process. This process 
makes political co-operation and integration increas-
ingly more salient as Globalization widens and deepens. 
8 George Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing the start of Mili-
tary Action in the Persian Gulf, 16 January 1991: http://bushlibrary.ta-
mu.edu/research/public papers.php ?id=2625&year= 1991 &month=Ol. 
9 The SIPRI, Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm Peace 
Research Institute: http://milexdata.sipri.org/resuit.php4. 
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States are still the main actors in international politics 
but other actors have emerged and seem to be growing. 
This appears to be the new stage in Globalisation. 
The international system is also characterised by 
new security threats such as the rise of the phenom-
enon of international terrorism post 9111, the threat 
posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD), particularly of nuclear weapons, and the 
persistence of rogue states which threaten to unbalance 
delicate regional and global equilibria as well as other 
nuisances such as piracy off the coasts of Somalia. But 
on the bright side, we have recently witnessed positive 
developments such as the START agreement between 
Russia and the USA, which is still in the process of rati-
fication, the Nuclear Safety Summit held in Washington 
in April 2010 with the objective of strengthening the se-
curity around weapons-grade plutonium to ensure that 
it does not fall into the wrong hands and the five-yearly 
review which took place in May 2010 of the Non-Prolif-
eration Treaty (NPT). 
The other aspect of the current international sys-
tem is multi-polarity. Without joining the polemic as to 
whether multi-polarity has in reality always existed or 
not, or whether indeed multi-polarity has been achieved, 
it appears clear that it is being constantly enhanced as 
evidenced by the relative decline of the US and Europe 
in the world and the rise of «new» global actors such as 
China, India, Brazil and the re-emergence of Russia as a 
great power (the so-called BRICs). To these one can also 
add other states with a substantial influence in their 
region such as Japan, Indonesia and Iran. The main 
difference in the present multipolarism is that, where-
as in the past the powers without a real global reach 
tended to confine themselves to the their regions (China 
and India to Asia, Brazil to Latin America, Iran to the 
Gulf), what we witness now are strong, calculated, pin-
cer movements using non-military means such as trade 
64 
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agreements and investments, into regions traditionally 
perceived as the preserve of USA and European influ-
ence. All this has itself been facilitated by Globalization 
and bv such international organizations as the World 
" ~ 
Trade Organization (WTO). What is also paradoxical is 
that the emergence of «new» global actors on the world 
scene and their increased influence in regions where 
they have historically enjoyed little or no influence as 
just outlined, contrasts sharply with the other trend 
commented upon earlier, of global increases in military 
expenditure. If interdependence, liberalisation, globally 
enforceable rules are the world powers' favourite tools 
in extending their influence, what is the use of increased 
military expenditure? 
Within this context the EU, as one of the major glo-
bal actors, has adopted a «civilian power» approach 
that calls upon it to act as «smart power» or a «norma-
tive power» 10. 
10 Fran~ois Duchene originally coined the «Civilian Powen>, for 
the EU though in 1973 Johan Galtung saw the EC as a «superpower 
in the making», an ideal peace system for its member states but an 
imperial power for the rest. The debate has raged on and off since 
and the following references are useful: Johan Galtung, The Euro-
pean Community: A Superpower in the Making, Universiretsforlaget, 
Oslo and George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1973; Hedley Bull, 
«Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?», Journal of Com-
mon Market Studies, vol. 21, n.o 2, 1982, pp. 149-164; Panayiotis Ifes-
tos, European Political Cooperation: Towards a Framework of Supra-
national Diplomacy?, Avebury, 1987. More recently, Robert Kagan, 
«Power and Weakness», Policy Review, n.ol13 (June and July 2002); 
Joseph S. Nye (1990), Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of Ameri-
can Power, Basic Books, New York 1990; «A Smarter Superpower», 
Foreign Policy, May-June 2007, pp. 46-47; Francis Fukuyama, «US 
Must Balance Hard Power With Soft Power», New Perspectives Quar-
terly, vol. 21, Issue 3, July 2004; Karen E. Smith, «The End of Civilian 
Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause of Concern?», The Interna-
tional Spectator, vol. 35, n.o 2, April-June 2000; Ian Manners, «Norma-
tive Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?», Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 40, n.o 2, 2002, pp. 235-258; Hanns W. Maull, 
«European and the New Balance of Global Orden>, International Af-
fairs, vol. 81, n.o 4,2005, pp. 775-799; Stelios Stavridis, «Strengthen-
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The EU's choice has been criticized as the only choice 
of a weak power and praised as the best approach in 
contemporary international relations. Without enter-
ing into the merits of this polemic here, it is quite clear 
that within the ambit of the «civilian power» approach 
Parliaments have a very important role to play: their 
consent is required to legitimize major foreign policy 
decisions and to garner the necessary domestic support 
for them, while their activism in international affairs 
makes them distinct actors in their own right. The op-
portunities for independent initiatives of parliaments 
and parliamentarians have increased in recent years. 
Of course, the effectiveness of the world's parliaments 
varies across the board. It is not our intention to survey 
the many parliamentary initiatives in the world and this 
chapter focuses on a special kind of «activism» name-
ly trans-national, as opposed to sub-national, regional 
parliaments. 
Other Positive Developments 
Starting in the early 1970s, the universalization of 
human rights as a principle for foreign policy, albeit 
consigned to the rhetorical level, confirmed the need 
to implement the post-WW2 United Nations Charter 
in practice. In the immediate and subsequent post-
Cold War years, the promotion of human rights was 
strengthened further and following a number of cases of 
wholesale genocide (e. g. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, 
Burundi) a new role for International Justice was devel-
oped mainly by the establishment of the International 
ing the Continued Relevance of "Civilian Power Europe": the need 
to re-visit its democratic Scrutiny Dimension», Hellenic Centre for 
European Studies (EKEM) , paper 6, July 2006; Kalypso Nicolaidis, 
"The Power of the Superpowerless», in Tod Lindberg (ed.), Beyond 
Paradise and Power: Europe, America, and the Future of a Troubled 
Partnership, Routledge, 2005, pp. 93-120. 
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Criminal Court. In 2001, following a Canadian Govern-
ment initiative, the International Commission on Inter-
vention and State Sovereignty issued the famous report, 
The Responsibility to Protect, which argued in favour of 
intervention bv the international community, including 
. . ~ 
by military means, to stop the wholesale suppression 
of Human Rights particularly where genocide is con-
cerned and where a government has manifestly failed to 
protect its own citizens 11. 
This again raised the issue of the limitations of sov-
ereignty and proposed a right of intervention, on which 
there was no international concurrence given that it 
went against the most basic principle of classical inter-
national relations: that of sovereignty and non-interven-
tion. It also raised another issue namely that of double 
standards. 
This is where parliamentary bodies that transcend 
national borders have a role to play. In the past few dec-
ades their numbers have expanded enormously. Some 
assessments mention the figure of over 70 such insti-
tutions in the first years of the 21st century. Whether 
we are witnessing the beginning of a road towards a 
better, more moral, accountable and democratic World 
remains an open question. But the intentions are there, 
and so are the means. The underlying assumption here 
is not necessarily of a Fukuyama style of optimism, but 
it is also correct to argue that there is no alternative 
to democracy since other alternatives have failed to de-
liver -politically, socially and economically-. While 
not being a panacea, it remains a prerequisite, a nec-
essary if not a sufficient condition for a better world 
system. This may not be universally accepted but it is 
a much more realistic and accurate perspective than 
11 The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Intemational Com-
mission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Ottawa, December 2001. 
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those of any fundamentalists/extremists who literally 
offer nothing more than explosive and destructive com-
binations 12. 
It is within this context that it is usually assumed 
that «civilian power Europe» offers a model for an ac-
tor in a multilateral world, where the rule of law and the 
respect of human rights will prevail. The model is no 
doubt important generally speaking, i.e. as a model of 
integration; although not necessarily as a model for in-
ternational relations. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty is meant 
to give the EU a better platform for playing its role as a 
«Civilian Power». But this also raises expectations (both 
within the EU and its member states and outside) about 
the EU's international behaviour: that it must pursue 
less realpolitik and more the pursuit of its values such 
as democracy and human rights 13. 
The question of consistency between rethoric and 
reality becomes an important issue and not just one of 
theoretical and «academic» importance. 
In the case of the Mediterranean, without entering 
into a lot of detail, the European Union, its institutions 
(both the European Commission and the European Par-
liament) and several of its member states (especially the 
Mediterranean European ones, most recently France 
via the 2007 Sarkozy initiative) have been active inter-
national actors. Whether this can be explained via con-
structivist or more traditional realist theories, includ-
ing Neoclassical Realism, is beyond the scope of this 
study 14. 
12 Andre Glucksmann, «La aterradora logica de la bomba huma-
na», El Pais, 04.05.10. 
13 Sonia Lucarelli and Lorenzo Fioramonti, The External Percep-
tions of the European Union as a Global Actor; Routledge, London, 
2009. 
14 Fulvio Attina, «The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Assessed: 
The Realist and Liberal Views», European Foreign Affairs Review, 
vol. 8, n.D 2,2003, pp. 181-200; Stefano Costalli, «Power over the Sea: 
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What is important here is the empirical observation 
that the Mare Nostrum is consistently referred to as an 
area of EU priority. 
PART 1. PARLIAMENTS AS INTERNATIONAL 
ACTORS 
A relatively new question 
Attention to the relative importance, role and impact 
of parliaments as international actors falls within the tra-
ditional International Relations debate between idealists 
and realists, incompatibilists and international demo-
cratic theorists, to name but a few. Empirically speaking, 
most attention has been given to the parliamentary input 
of the «democratic superpower»: the US Congress 15. 
Generally speaking, the parliamentarization of inter-
national affairs is a world-wide phenomenon that con-
tains at least three important, interrelated, and in fact 
mutually-reinforcing, dimensions 16: 
to control foreign policy widely defined at the 
parliamentary level (most current democracies 
are indirect democracies); 
to engage in «parliamentary diplomacy»; 
to act through established regional and other par-
liamentary bodies. 
That is to say that the institutionalization of inter-
parliamentary cooperation shows that the internation-
The Relevance of Neoclassical Realism to Euro-Meditenanean Rela-
tions», Mediterranean Politics, vol. 14, n.o 3, pp. 323-342. 
15 Lisa Martin, Democratic Commitments - Legislatures and In-
ternational Cooperation, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000. 
16 For details, see Andres Malamud, Stelios Stavridis, «Parlia-
ments and parliamentarians in regional international organizations», 
in Bob Reinalda (ed.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State 
Actors, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2011, pp. 101-115. 
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al relations of parliamentary bodies have developed 
much further than «just» traditional technical, finan-
cial and training cooperation; most of which are re-
lated to the consolidation of «the constitutional state, 
enhancing the proper functioning of democratic insti-
tutions through the improvement of the parliamentary 
work» 17. 
Proliferation of International Parliamentary 
Assemblies 
There is a global trend towards a gradual expansion 
and deepening of international parliamentary co-opera-
tion. One important way through which parliaments en-
gage in regionalism is via the setting up of International 
Parliamentary Assemblies (IPIs), usually of a formal 
and highly institutionalised manner, based on written 
statutes and rules of procedures 18. Three developments 
have been identified 19. 
their expansion in the last sixty to seventy years; 
their expansion in terms of geographic spread of 
this type of organisation; 
17 For details see: Technical Parliamentary Cooperation, French 
Senate: www.senat.fr/international/english/coop.html (accessed 
19.02.08). UN Division for Sustainable Development, UN Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs, Technical Cooperation: www.un.org/ 
esa/sustdev/tech coop/tech coop.htm (accessed 19.02.08). 
18 See Robert Cutler, «The OSCE's Parliamentary Diplomacy in 
Central Asia and the South Caucasus in Comparative Perspective}}, 
Studia Diplomatica - Brussels Journal of International Relations, 
vol. LIX, n.o 2, 2006, pp. 79-93; Zlatko Sabic, «Building Democratic 
and Responsible Global Governance: The Role of International Par-
liamentary Institutions}}, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 61, n.o 2, 2008, 
pp. 255-271. 
19 Stefan Marschall, «European Parliaments in Transnational 
Organisations: Parliamentary Cooperation beyond the European Un-
ion}}, Paper prepared to the SWP Conference «Fifty Years of Interpar-
liamentary Cooperation}}, 13 June 2007, Berlin. 
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- their affiliation to intergovernmental orgamsa-
tions (as a general rule) 20. 
Regional parliamentarization is expressed through 
the work of interparliamentary organs established 
within the framework of regional organisations. Parlia-
mentary assemblies create a direct link between the na-
tional and the international decision-making levels. At 
~ 
the same time, linking parliaments to regionalism also 
brings in its impact on democratization. As Alex War-
leigh argues, «[rJegional integration can be a force for 
(liberal) democratisation» 21. 
Though (inter)parliamentarization is by definition a 
formal, elite-driven process (i.e. engaging national or re-
gional parliaments), its agenda reflects a new approach 
to regionalism: it does not merely involve cooperation 
among parliaments or parliamentary diplomacy, but it 
aims to strengthen other elements such as the involve-
ment of civil society and non-state actors. It is multi-di-
mensional and comprehensive, as well as an open form 
of regionalism (known as «New Regionalism» or «Open 
Regionalism») 22. 
It is important to note also that there are different 
«levels» of parliamentary input, just as there are vari-
ous levels of governance, levels of governments in mul-
ti-level governance systems (especially clear in federal 
states and in «quasi»-federalized ones, c.f. Spain's au-
tonomous communities). Thus, it is possible to argue 
20 There are exceptions, long standing ones like PARLATINO 
(Latin American Parliament) or more recent ones like the PAM (Par-
liamentary Assembly of the Medi terranean). 
21 Alex Warleigh, «In Defence of Intra-disciplinarity: "European 
Studies", the "New Regionalism", and the Issue of Democratisation», 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, July, vol. 17, n.D 2, pp. 301-
318,2004, p. 310. 
22 Bjorn Hettne, «The New Regionalism Revisited», in Soder-
baum, Fedrik and Shaw, Timothy (eds.), Theories of Nnv Regional-
ism: A Palgrave Reader, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2003, pp. 22-42. 
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that there are sub-state, state, supranational and other 
regional and interregional levels of parliamentary in-
put. In the case of the Mediterranean, this is a develop-
ing dimension, as much in terms of paradiplomacy as 
in terms of parliamentary paradiplomacy. For reasons 
of space, we do not address this issue here. 
What «roles» do parliamentary bodies 
and parlamentarians actually perform in world 
politics? 
The main role for IPIs is to act as accountability and 
legitimization mechanisms for the regional integration 
process they are often related to. The literature on the 
subject remains rather limited to date. This is particu-
larly relevant and appropriate for regional integration 
processes, or even inter-regional relations with a view 
to establishing Free-Trade Areas or other more sophisti-
cated «Bi-regional Strategic Associations». For instance, 
as is often the case in several EU institutionalized agree-
ments with other regions of the world, such as the one 
with African, Caribbean and Pacific States (EU-ACP 
Joint Parliamentary Assembly), or the more recent one 
with Latin America and the Caribbean (EUROLAT). 
However a different literature, focusing more on 
parliamentary diplomacy as such has begun to focus on 
other functions that parliamentary bodies are perform-
ing more and more. There are at least four such func-
tions 23: 
(1) parliamentary bodies as «moral tribunes»; 
(2) parliamentary input in election monitoring; 
23 Stelios Stavridis, «Parliamentary Diplomacy»: Some Prelimi-
nary Findings, Jean Monnet Working Paper in Comparative ill Inter-
national Politics, n.o 48, Universita di Catania, November 2002, WWW. 
fscpo.unict.it/euromed/cimhome.htm; Gabriel Eloriagga, La diplo-
macia parlamentaria, Imagine Ediciones, Madrid, 2004. 
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(3) their role in the so-called «socialization effect»; 
(4) parliamentary diplomacy and conflict resolu-
tion (prevention, settlement). 
It is often argued that parliaments act as «moral trib-
unes» on foreign policy issues. Because parliamentar-
ians do not have to necessarily follow the official gov-
ernmental line, they can be more «flexible» and even 
allow themselves the «luxury» of adopting a normative 
(i. e. moral) approach. As David Beetham has argued, 
parliamentarians do not necessarily «coincide with 
their respective country's official position on any given 
issue. This allows parliamentarians a margin of flexibil-
ity that is denied to the diplomat». He also claims that 
they «tend to bring a moral dimension to international 
politics that transcends narrow definitions of the na-
tional interest, particularly in their principled support 
for democracy and human rights» 24. Others concur: 
«Realpolitik concerns are of less interest for the repre-
sentatives of the European peoples sitting in the Euro-
pean Parliament» 25. 
24 David Beetham, Parliament and Democracy in the Twenty-first 
Century: A Guide to Good Practice, Interparliamentary Union, 2006: 
www.ipu.org, p. 11 (emphasis added). 
25 Flavia Zenon, «The European Parliament: an autonomous for-
eign policy identity?», in Barbe, Esther and Herranz, Anna (eds.), 
The role of Parliaments in European foreign policy-Debating on ac-
countability and legitimacy\ Office of the European Parliament in 
Barcelona, Barcelona, 2005, p. 118. For more details, see also Ab-
delwahab Biad, cPuede la institucionalizaci6n de una dimensi6n par-
lamentaria dina mizar el Partenariado Euromediterrdneo?, Med. 2005, 
IEMedJInstituto Europeo del Mediternineo and CIDOB, Barcelona, 
2005, pp. 110-113: www.cidob.org; Roderick Pace, Stelios Stavridis, 
2010, «The EMPA, 2004-2008: Assessing the first four years of the 
parliamentary dimension of the Barcelona Process», Mediterranean 
Quarterly, Spring 2010, vol. 21, n.C 2, pp. 90-113. A large number of 
parliamentarians have repeatedly made this point on the internation-
al role of parliaments to one of the authors of this piece in a series 
of interviews over several years: Stelios Stavridis, «The Parliamen-
tary Forum of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: an assessment», 
Mediterranean Politics, vol. 7, n.c 2, Summer 2002, pp. 30-53; «The 
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There are however also signs that this may not al-
ways be the case. When important national interests 
are at stake, many parliamentarians, especially within 
the government's ranks, often tend to close ranks with 
~ 
their Executive. As foreign policy issues are very often 
bipartisan in their nature any such stance may limit the 
moral or moralistic view that is often displayed in gen-
eral parliamentary gatherings. Recent analyses of the 
EP stance on Cyprus and Turkey point to a strong dose 
of Realpolitik, often at the expense of morality but also 
international legal standards 26. The same can be said 
about the way the EP dealt with the Sarkozy Initiative. 
Instead of displaying clear signs of Europeanization, 
most MEPs reacted in defence of their established na-
tional interests 27. 
Electoral monitoring is often regarded as an impor-
tant element in democratisation, especially for non-
democratic countries. The participation of parliamen-
tarians in election monitoring does not only follow 
logically from their belonging to a parliament. It also 
international relations of the Cypriot Parliament», Journal of South-
ern Europe and the Balkans, vol. 5, n.D 3, December 2003, pp. 337-354; 
«The European Parliament and the Cyprus Problem: a preliminary 
-and critical- assessment», Institute of International Economic Re-
lations Working Paper, n.D 24, Athens, July 2006: www.idec.gr/iier; To-
wards a «European solution» of the Cyprus Problem? assessing the 
views of some (Greek-)Cypriots MEPs, Fundaci6n Seminario de In-
vestigaci6n para la Paz, Zaragoza, 22.05.06, 2006: www.seipaz.org. 
26 See Stelios Stavridis, Charalambos Tsardanidis, «The Cyprus 
Problem in the European Parliament: a case of successful or super-
ficial Europeanisation?», European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 14, 
n.D 1, February 2009, pp. 129-156. On the Western Sahara issue, see 
Jordi Vaquer i Fanes, «The European Union and Western Sahara», 
European Foreign Affairs Review, vo!' 9, n.D 1, 2004, pp. 93-113. 
27 Stelios Stavridis, George Tzogopoulos, «The European Parlia-
ment and the Debate over Sarkozy's Mediterranean Initiative: A Pre-
liminary Assessment», Etudes HelleniqueslHellenic Studies (Special 
Issue on «Union for the Mediterranean: National and Regional Per-
spectives»; Guest editors: Dimitris Xenakis and Panayotis Tsakonas), 
va!. 17, n.D 2, Autumn 2009, pp. 239-260. 
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shows that they have an important international role to 
play. In the EMPA, it has been argued that there is a need 
for «the strengthening of democratic processes in all the 
partner countries, particularly the sound organisation of 
elections» 28. Many a national parliamentarian has been 
involved in election monitoring throughout the world. 
The European Parliament has been involved in numer-
ous election monitoring missions over the years 29. 
In the existing literature, the «socialization effect» is 
usually referred to a process that has taken place (or is 
taking place when analyzed from a «process» perspec-
tive) in situations where parliamentarians from demo-
cratic countries mix with their counterparts from un-
democratic or partly democratic ones. Such institutional 
frameworks are supposed to socialize the non-democrat-
ic members over time in democratic practices. 
This is at least the theory. In practice many problem-
atic questions remain unresolved: one of them is the 
question of time. How much time is given to that proc-
ess? How does one evaluate its impact? Whatever the 
limitations, most parliamentarians accept that on the 
whole this is a process worth investing time and effort 
in. One of the reasons being the alternative: not to en-
gage at all. 
Of course, there are also other mitigating circum-
stances: for instance, the counterparts to EP interpar-
28 Point 44, «Resolution of the EMPA on the assessment of the 
Barcelona Process on the eve of its tenth anniversary, adopted on 15 
March 2005 in Cairo (Egypt) on the basis of the resolution tabled by 
Mrs Tokia Salfi, Chairperson, on behalf of the Committee on Politi-
cal, Security and Human Rights Issues», First Session of the Euro-
Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, Cairo, March 2005, p. 64 
(emphasis added). 
29 32 such missions during the 1994-1999 term; 37 during the 
199-2004; and no less than 59 during the 2004-2009 term. There is 
a webpage on the EP website dedicated to what is called Election 
Observation, not to ruffle sensitivities: www.europarl.europa.eu/int-
coop/election observation/implementing provisions en. pdf. 
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liamentary assemblies cannot be just representatives of 
their respective regimes (usually appointed diplomats), 
as was the case in the past 30. There is no need to say that 
those regimes have invented ways of circumventing this 
hurdle, but it is yet another additional obstacle that they 
still need to overcome. The question remains whether 
non-democratic regimes parliamentary representatives 
act indeed as parliamentarians or whether they only 
represent the parliamentary arms of governing elites. 
In short are they, for want of a better term, diplomats 
disguised as MPs? 
As for conflict, to quote again Beetham, «[t]he ces-
sation of regional conflict is the first imperative for re-
gional parliamentary dialogue» 31. In the words of the 
Deputy Speaker of the Parliament of Tanzania, Anne 
Makinda: 
«Parliaments should also be seen increasingly as fo-
rums that can assist in peace-building and conflict reso-
lution in those LDC countries that are either at risk of or 
are emerging from conflict» 32. 
For instance, Alain Berset of Switzerland's Council 
of States (i. e. Senate) reminds us that «the first contact 
between the British and the Argentinians after the Falk-
lands War took place within the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union», adding further that a «meeting between North 
30 French Green MEP Alima Boumediene interview, in Stelios 
Stavridis, «The Parliamentary Forum of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership: an assessment», Mediterranean Politics, vol. 7, n.o 2, 
Summer 2002, pp. 47-48. 
31 David Beetham, Parliament and Democracy in the Twenty-first 
Century: A Guide to Good Practice, Interparliamentary Union, 2006: 
www.ipu.org, p. 11. 
32 Statement by the Honourable Anne S. Makinda, Deputy Speak-
er of the Parliament of Tanzania on behalf of the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union, High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the mid-term 
review of the implementation of the Programme of Action for the 
Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2001-2010, United Na-
tions, New York, 18 September 2006. 
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and South Korean parliamentary representatives [also 
took place) within the framework of this same organisa-
tion, which also set up a meeting of Israeli and Palestin-
ian parliamentary representatives ( ... )>> 33. 
Although sometimes traditional diplomats consider 
parliamentarians as «interfering in» their own work 34, 
this is a rather old-fashioned approach that does not 
necessarily reflect the reality of international relations 
in the 21st century. It goes without saying that it is also 
possible for parliamentarians to «respecter un devoir de 
reserve», to use the words of Xavier de Villepin, then 
President of the French Senate's Foreign Affairs, De-
fence and Armies Committee 35. It is often the case that 
members of Foreign Affairs or Defence and Security 
Committees are allowed to view «secret» documents as 
long as they do not divulge their content. A similar ex-
ample exists with the Committee of Five in the Europe-
an Parliament. Although there is always the risk of «co-
opting» parliamentarians into a culture of secrecy, but 
possible risks should not outweigh any real benefits 36. 
PART 2. PARLIAMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL 
CONFLICTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
Sadly, the Mediterranean region is almost synony-
mous with «conflicts» 37. Therefore, it would appear that 
33 Proceedings of the European Conference of Presidents of Par-
liaments in Tallinn (Estonia) on 30-31 May 2006, p. 4S. 
34 «Un parasitage dans les negotiations» to use the words of Ge-
rard Davet and Pascal Ceaux, «Le cas Julia», Le Mowle, 09.03.05: 
www.lemonde.fr. 
35 Senat, La diplomatie parlementaire, Actes du Colloque, French 
Senate, Paris, 2001: www.senat.fr (accessed 17 .OS.05), p. 16. 
36 C. Castairs, R. Ware (eds.), Parliament and international affairs, 
OUP, Oxford, 1991. 
37 See Paul Balta, «La Mediterranee en tant que zone de conflits», 
Revista CIDOB d'Afers Intemacionals, vol. 37, 1997, pp. 9-1S. 
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conflict resolution represents an «ideal» case for assess-
ing the impact of parliamentary diplomacy, especially 
within the deeply institutionalised context of the EMPA. 
In the various EMPA documents to date it is also clear 
that conflict resolution is considered to be one of the 
key roles for the Assembly. To list but one such exam-
ple: the EMPA President (March 2009-March 2010), the 
Speaker of the Jordanian Parliament, Mr. Abdul-Hadi 
Al Majali, made it quite clear in his inaugural speech 
as President, that «we must focus on the Middle East 
peace process, because without a just and lasting peace 
in our region, all these goals will be difficult to achieve» 
(r. e. the goals as defined by the UfM agenda) 38. 
Other parliamentary bodies take the same stance on 
the need to find a solution to the Middle East Conflict. 
The «other» Mediterranean Assembly, the Parliamen-
tary Assembly of the Mediterranean' has repeatedly 
stated so. During its November 2008 Plenary in Mo-
naco, Maltese MP George Vella acted as Rapporteur 
for a PAM report on the Middle East which reiterated 
similar points. In February 2010, the PAM organized 
with the United Nations in Malta an International 
Meeting in support of Israeli-Palestinian Peace. During 
the event a message sent by UN Secretary-General Ban-
Ki Moon was read to all participants. Malta's Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tonio 
Borg (as the representative of the host country), said 
that parliamentarians had a role to play in supporting 
peace and stability through this kind of meetings that 
go beyond traditional diplomatic means. Former Jor-
danian MP and PAM Vice-President Suleiman Ghnei-
mat expressed a similar view: «parliamentarians in the 
38 Remarks by H. E. Mr. Abdul-Hadi Al Majali at the 5th Plenary 
session of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly as the 
New President (15-17 March 2009, Brussels): www.europarl.europa. 
eu/intcoop/empa/plenary sessions/plenary session 032009/speech 
abdulhadi majali.pdf. 
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Mediterranean -representing more than SOO million 
people- Coo.) could playa basic role in the promotion 
of conventional diplomacy in search of permanent and 
just solutions to these issues that influenced their re-
gion» 39. 
Now that we have clearly established that both prac-
titioners and academics agree that conflict resolution 
should be a key priority for parliamentary assemblies 
and parliamentary diplomacy, we turn to three specif-
ic case-studies. Before doing that, we will outline the 
reasons why all three conflicts are important for Euro-
Mediterranean relations at all levels. Although it is im-
portant to note that what follows is not an analysis of 
conflict case-studies. It will focus instead on how and 
why those specific conflicts are preventing progress in 
the EMPlUfM. But before we come to that point it is 
important to focus a little more on the EMPA itself. 
The EMPA 
The EMPA's power have so far been limited to mak-
ing recommendations but the European Parliament has 
tried to turn it into the parliamentary arm of the UfM 
wherein it would have an important say in the decisions 
taken. In June 2008, the EP approved a resolution in 
which it welcomed an EU Commission proposal calling 
for the EMPA to become an integral part of the institu-
tional framework of the «Barcelona Process: Union for 
the Mediterranean» CBP-UfM), as its parliamentary di-
mension. The Parliament insisted that the enhancement 
of democratic legitimacy is necessary, as is the strength-
39 International UN-Pam meeting in support of Israeli-Palestin-
ian peace - Highlights of the Proceedings, Prepared by the Depart-
ment of Public Information of the UN, 12-13 February 2010, Qavvra, 
Malta: www.apm.org.mt/documents/pdfs/PAM%20UN%20INFO%20 
W%20COVER %201402201 O.pdf. 
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ening of the role of the EMPA, the only parliamentary 
assembly uniting the 27 EU Member States and all the 
parties involved in the Middle East peace process. The 
EP also stated that it considers that the EMPA, as a con-
sultative body, should have the right to make proposals 
and assessments 40. 
However, at the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean 
which was held the following month, the EU and Medi-
terranean leaders dashed any hope of giving the Assem-
bly the powers it was seeking, conceding only that «The 
Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly will be 
the legitimate parliamentary expression of the BP-UfM. 
Heads of State and Government strongly support the 
strengthening of the role of the EMPA in its relations 
with Mediterranean partners» 41. 
In reaction to this setback, on the 12 October 2008, 
at a meeting in Jordan, the EMPA made another ef-
fort to convince the member states of the BP-UfM into 
strengthening its powers. This was done in a «Recom-
mendation» addressed to the then forthcoming Medi-
terranean ministerial meeting in Marseilles 42. 
In this «Recommendation», EMPA stated that, as a 
follow-up to the Paris Joint Declaration of 13 July 2008, 
the ministers should formally declare the Euro-Medi-
terrane an Parliamentary Assembly to be an integral 
part of the «Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediter-
40 Point 15 in European Parliament resolution of 5 June 2008 
on the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean (P6_ 
TA(2008)0257). 
41 Point 17 of the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the 
Mediterranean, Paris, 13 July 2008. 
42 Recommendation from the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary 
Assembly to the first meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the 
Barcelona process: Union for the Mediterranean (Marseille, 3-4 No-
vember 2008) on the role of the Euro Mediterranean Parliamentary 
Assembly within the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterra-
nean. 
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ranean», as its parliamentary institution. The recom-
mendation also called for a legal basis to be created and 
a formal link established between the executive branch 
and the parliamentary branch of the Barcelona Proc-
ess: Union for the Mediterranean, further stressing that 
such a legal basis should include the practical details 
of this link. It was stressed that these details should 
provide for decisions on mutual representation at re-
spective meetings and the need to take due account of 
each institution's work in drafting agendas, etc., which, 
in any case, should safeguard the independence of the 
partnership's institutions. As far as financing and the 
necessary organizational set up were concerned, the 
EMPA recommendation stressed that the future com-
petences of the various institutions were to be respect-
ed. Had EMP~s demands been met, the parliamentary 
dimension of the BP-UfM would have advanced a sub-
stantial way. 
However, a number of objectives that EMPA should 
pursue and which were included in the «recommenda-
tion» may have alarmed the governments of the south-
ern Mediterranean states into resisting these demands. 
For, in the recommendation the EMPA stated in no un-
certain terms that in its role as a consultative body, it 
would: 
- promote democratic processes and human rights 
through cultural and political dialogue and con-
sultation; 
facilitate greater understanding between the peo-
ples of the European Union and those of the Med-
iterranean partner states; raise public awareness 
of cooperation necessities; 
discuss issues pertaining to the BP-UfM; 
hold to account the institutional structure of the 
BP-UfM; 
adopt resolutions and make recommendations to 
the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Affairs Minis-
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ters with a view of achieving the objectives of the 
BP-UfM43. 
At their November 2008 meeting, the ministers end-
ed all hope that the EMPA could be developed as the 
parliamentary dimension of the UfM in the foreseeable 
future to the extent to which the EP and EMPA were 
pushing for. The ministers simply stated that they be-
lieved «that the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary As-
sembly (EMPA) reinforces the democratic legitimacy of 
the Partnership. They duly take note of the EMPA rec-
ommendation adopted in Jordan on the 13th October 
2008. The BP-UfM requires a strong parliamentary di-
mension. Therefore the Ministers underline that the po-
sition of the EMPA should be further consolidated and 
its work better articulated with the other institutions of 
the Partnership». At the same time, and in what surely 
must be considered as another snub of the Mediterra-
nean parliamentarians, they went on to «stress the need 
to promote the implementation of concrete action at lo-
cal and regional level. In this respect, they commend the 
Forum of Local and Regional Authorities that was held 
on 22 and 23 June 2008 in Marseille. They also duly take 
note of the Committee of Regions' opinion issued on 9 
October 2008 and the proposal to create a Euro-Medi-
terranean Regional and Local Assembly. The Assembly's 
members would represent EU local and regional elected 
officials and elected officials from Mediterranean part-
ner countries equally, similar to parliamentary repre-
sentation in the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary As-
sembly» 44. 
Not only were the powers of the EMPA in the UfM 
not strengthened by the ministers, but EMPA's role and 
43 Ibid. 
44 Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, Ministerial 
Conference, Marseille, 3-4 November 2008, Final declaration, Coun-
cil of the European Union, Press Statement 15187/08 (Presse 314). 
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influence was further threatened bv a new accent and 
" 
encouragement which was placed on a rival assembly 
of representatives, the newly emerged Mediterranean 
Regional Assembly (2010). 
Most of the fears regarding the emergence of a 
strong parliamentary dimension of the UfM came from 
the Southern Mediterranean states. One diplomat from 
one of these countries, who does not wish to be named, 
expressed it in rather «sovereignty terms» claiming 
that his government could not be held accountable by 
a parliamentary assembly other than its own national 
parliament. Of course most of the governments of the 
Southern Mediterranean states are hardly held account-
able by their national parliaments, given the realities of 
their political systems, often referred to as «fa<;ade de-
mocracies». Southern Mediterranean political elites are 
very sensitive to criticism by democratic parliamentary 
assemblies and they have frequently reacted extremely 
negatively to criticism by the European Parliament. In 
January 2008, the Egyptian Foreign Minister called in 
the EU Ambassadors in Cairo to protest against an EP 
draft resolution which criticized his country's human 
rights record 45. 
According to reports in the media, quoting Cairo's 
foreign ministry spokesman Hossam Zaki, Egypt was 
not going to accept any attempt by any country to com-
ment on the human rights situation in Egypt, as it will 
not allow itself to lecture other countries over their do-
mestic affairs 46. 
Following the Marseille setback, the European Par-
liament had no alternative but to declare a truce, leav-
45 European Parliament resolution of 17 January 2008 on the 
situation in Egypt (P6_TA(2008)0023). 
46 EU Business: http://vvvvw.eubusiness.comlnews-eu/12005740 
21.32/?searchterm-None (accessed 20.03.2010), report filed on 17 
January 2010. 
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ing the possibility open for further developments in the 
future. On the 19 February 2009, it approved a resolu-
tion in which it stated that it: 
«Welcomes the decision of the Ministerial Confer-
ence of 3 November 2008, which duly took note of the 
recommendation adopted by the EMPA in Jordan on 13 
October 2008; supports the decision to bring a strong 
parliamentary dimension to the Union for the Mediter-
ranean, thereby reinforcing its democratic legitimacy, 
by building on the EMPA, which should be further con-
solidated and its work better articulated with that of the 
other institutions of the Partnership, with the possibil-
ity being envisaged of granting it legal personality and 
entitling it to propose and assess economic and regional 
integration strategies and projects and allowing it to 
make recommendations to the meetings of foreign af-
fairs ministers; expects this recognition of the EMPA as 
an institution also to be reflected by its participating as 
an observer at all meetings of the executive, at meetings 
of the Heads of State and Government, at ministerial 
meetings and at the preparatory meetings of senior of-
ficials» 47. 
Reviewing these events in his closing speech at the 
fifth ordinary plenary session of the Euro-Mediterrane-
an Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) held in Brussels, 
17 March 2009, Hans-Gert Pottering, president of the 
EP/EMPA said: «Today, however, we must acknowledge 
that the process of integrating the EMPA into the Union 
for the Mediterranean as its parliamentary institution 
is not yet complete ... One day -I am convinced- the 
EMPA will be the "parliament" of the Union for the 
Mediterranean» . 
47 European Parliament resolution of 19 February 2009 on the 
Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean (2008!2231(INI)) 
P63A(2009)0077. 
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1. THE THREE CONFLICTS UNDER STUDY 
The Middle East 
The situation in the Middle East leads to general in-
stability in its immediate vicinity, while its shock waves 
reverberate throughout the Mediterranean region. In-
deed, over the past decades, the Arab-Israeli conflict has 
led to a destabilizing arms race in the Middle East af-
fecting all the states of the region. This is slowly trans-
forming itself into one involving weapons of mass de-
struction (WMDs). It provides Arab governments with 
the excuse to delay or oppose democratic reforms. It 
leads to periodic wasteful flare-ups that create disrup-
tion of human and economic life in the states involved. 
In this respect one only has to mention the Intifadas, 
the 2006 war in Lebanon, the January 2009 Israeli at-
tacks on Gaza, and the Israel air raids on Gaza in April 
2010. Such flare-ups also have a negative effect on the 
very volatile price of oil. Some argue that the Middle 
East conflict -along with the American occupation of 
Iraq- continue to provide grist to the terrorist mill. 
This is a rather facile argument because it would be 
wrong to conclude that these are the sole root causes of 
the terrorist phenomenon. The shadow of the conflict 
hangs over the Mediterranean. It is one of the many, 
though not the only, important factors that negatively 
affect economic growth in the Arab areas affected by 
war (Israel, Palestinian Territories, Iraq) and undercuts 
neighbouring states 48. 
48 Sufyan Alissa lists a number of factors retarding reform in the 
Arab world apart from the conflict in «The Challenge of Economic 
Reform in the Arab World: Toward more Productive Economies», 
Carnegie Middle East Center, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, n.D 1, May 7, 2007; but the authors of the Arab Human Devel-
opment Report 2009, UNDP chapter 8, page 165 forward have placed 
a greater emphasis on the economic effects of conflict on economic 
growth. 
85 
STELIOS STAVRIDIS/RODERICK PACE 
A solution will stop the regional arms race, and un-
block possibly the way to long-awaited reforms in the 
Arab world. Significantly, on 9 May 2010, coincidentally 
the day when the Schuman Declaration is commemo-
rated in Europe, indirect talks between Israel and the 
Palestinians began through US mediation thus ending 
17 months of stalemate. 
Cyprus 
The Cyprus Problem continues to trouble relations 
between the EU/European Union and Turkey, also im-
pinging on NATO's cohesion. The Cyprus Problem has 
often led to confrontations between Greece and Turkey 
in the Aegean. 
In a seminar on the Cyprus Problem organized in 
2004 by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, Lt. Col. Peter Najera, Country Director for 
Greece and Cyprus, Office of the US Secretary of De-
fence, was reported to have said: 
«In military circles the Cyprus problem is seen as 
the last major source of tension in the Aegean. A settle-
ment in Cyprus will open the floodgates for cooperation 
among the nations of the region in NATO, the United Na-
tions, and the U.S.-led global war on terrorism» 49. 
On 7 November 2008, the International press re-
ported that Turkey had rejected a set of proposals by 
the EU to unblock planned co-operation of Cyprus with 
NATO. The EU tried to find a solution to a long-lasting 
row with Turkey over Cyprus's participation in NATO-
led operations, but Ankara did not accept any of Brus-
sels' proposals (according to Gerard Araud, political 
director of the French Foreign Ministry, whose country 
49 www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event 
summary&event id-115388 (accessed 27.12.2008). 
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held at that time the EU rotating Presidency). Turkey 
objects to the participation of Cyprus in NATO opera-
tions, as this would mean recognising the Republic of 
Cyprus. This has made EU-NATO co-operation under 
the so called «Berlin Plus» arrangement difficult if not 
impossible. 
On Turkey's EU prospects, although it is true that the 
debate has shifted as far as Cyprus is concerned over 
the question of opening up a few ports and airports (and 
not about the illegal invasion, occupation and coloni-
zation of the north of the Island). And, several acces-
sion negotiations chapters have been blocked since the 
end of 2006 (eight of them, with another five by France 
over the question of membership or privileged partner-
ship) 50. 
A solution to the Cyprus Problem (another case of 
justice delayed) will benefit all the people in that island, 
remove a cause of internal turbulence from within the 
EU and NATO, and finally it might bring Turkey closer 
to its own accession ambitions 51. 
The Western Sahara 
The Western Sahara produces turbulence in the 
Maghreb, and negatively affects integration prospects 
in that sub-region, which is a goal very much desired 
50 See Stelios Stavridis, La Uni6n Europea y el conflicto chipriota 
(1974-2006), Editorial Icaria, Barcelona, 2008. 
51 We say «possibly» because there are plenty of other obstacles 
to Turkey's road to EU membership, see Aylin Guney, «The Politics 
of Turkey's Accession Process to the European Union», in Stavridis, 
Stelios (ed.), Understanding and Evaluating the European Union: the-
oretical and empirical approaches, Nicosia University Press, Nicosia, 
2009, pp. 269-291. On the question of a «case of justice delayed», 
see inter alia Costas Melakopides, «Reasons for Europe's Legal and 
Moral Duty to Honour its Own Principles and Values in the Republic 
of Cyprus», in ibid., pp. 331-356. 
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by the EU 52. For example, the Western Sahara issue has 
stifled economic integration in the Maghreb, notwith-
standing that the economic welfare gains that would 
accrue to all the participating states are such as to 
make the case for establishing the union a seemingly 
full proof one. The UMA (Arab Maghreb Union) is the 
most obvious victim of such a situation, with no border 
crossing allowed between Algeria and Morocco 53. Every 
time there is a crisis over relations between Spain and 
Morocco (like the 2000 Parsley Island incident) 54, the 
Western Sahara is regularly brought to the fore of inter-
national limelight. 
2. THE EMPA AND INTERNATIONAL 
CONFLICTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
2.1. The EMPA and conflicts 
The EMPA 
International inter-parliamentary cooperation in 
the Mediterranean has a long history, starting with the 
International Parliamentary Union (IPU) 55. Euro-Med-
52 Jordi Vaquer i Fanes, «The European Union and Western Sa-
hara», European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 9, n.c 1, 2004, pp. 93-113; 
«Espana y el Sahara Occidental: la dimensi6n partidista», Revista 
CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals, n.CS 79-80, December 2007, pp. 125-
144; Novais Rui, «The ENP and the Saharawi conflict resolution: 
doomed to failure?», in Andre Barrinha (ed), Towards a Global Di-
mension: EU's Conflict Management in the Neighbourhood and Be-
yond, Fundal; 0 Friedrich Ebert, Lisbon, 2008, pp. 85-98. 
53 See Yahia Zoubir, «Stalemate in Western Sahara: Ending In-
ternational Legality», Middle East Policy, vol. XIV, n.c 4, Winter 2007, 
pp. 158-177. 
54 Richard Gillespie, «This Stupid Little Island": A Neighbour-
hood Confrontation in the Western Mediterranean», International 
Politics, vol. 43, n.C 1,2006, pp. 110-132. 
55 The IPU's website is: www.ipu.org. 
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iterranean parliamentary cooperation as such has de-
veloped within the 1995 Barcelona Process, initially as 
the EMP Parliamentary Forum (1998-2003), and from 
2004 onwards as the EMPA 56. There are of course other 
parliamentary bodies involved in the Mediterranean re-
gion: Not only the national parliaments themselves or 
the EP, but also the PAs of the CoE, the OSCE, NATO, 
the WEU and an Arab initiative, the Arab Parliamentary 
Union which is crucial to the Euro-Arab Parliamentary 
Dialogue started in 1974. 
Conflicts 
In its initial phase, the Euro-Mediterranean Parlia-
mentary Assembly did not prioritize any of the major 
regional conflicts. This does not mean of course that 
they were not discussed at various levels within the 
EMPA itself. For instance, the EMPA November 2005 
Rabat Extraordinary Session and the 2006 Annual Ple-
nary in Brussels dealt mostly with the Middle East 57. 
Nor that these conflicts do not exercise any influence on 
the internal workings of the Assembly, or that they are 
utterly side-tracked. In fact, it could be argued that the 
56 The EMPA's website is: www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/ 
empaldefault.htm. Abdelwahab Biad, «Los parlamentos como nue-
vos actores del partenariado: hacia una diplomacia parlamentaria 
en el Mediterraneo», Agora-Revista de Ciencias Sociales, n.o 8, 2003, 
pp. 11-19; Cristina Retta, «La polftica euromediterranea: su dimen-
si6n parlamentaria en el proceso de Barcelona», Agora-Revista de 
Ciencias Sociales, n.o 9, 2003, pp. 37-51; Ioannis Seimenis, Miltiadis 
Makriyannis, «Reinvigorating the Parliamentary Dimension of the 
Barcelona Process: The Establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Parliamentary Assembly», Mediterranean Quarterly, Spring, 2005, 
pp. 85-105. 
57 EMPA, «Declaration of the Presidency Addressed to the Tenth 
Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit», Rabat, 21 November 
2005; EMPA 2nd Plenary Session Presidency Final Declaration, Brus-
sels, 27 March 2006. The same is true of subsequent Declarations. 
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EMPA has been «contaminated» by them as much as 
the EMP or the UfM. It is also true that initial «hopes» 
that the then newly-founded EMP would not be affected 
by any problems in the Middle East Peace Process (the 
peace process was quite upbeat in between 1993-1996, 
i.e. at the time of the EMP launch) turned out simply to 
be utopian dreams. 
It should also be noted that when situations of ten-
sion flare up into hot conflict, as happened in the case 
of the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon war or more recently with 
the January 2009 Israeli attack on Gaza, the EMPA did 
try to exercise some sort of a mediating role. Nowadays, 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a dominant subject 
for all Euro-Mediterranean relations and those include 
its parliamentary dimension. Hence, while initially the 
conflict seemed to have been given the back seat, now 
it has become a regular item on the agenda. As a result, 
it is now asphyxiating any form of debate and under-
mining the very role of parliamentary diplomacy par-
ticularly when events in the Middle East lead to some 
Partner or a group of them deserting the proceedings 
as happened when Syria and Lebanon (who did not at-
tend the Valencia Foreign Ministers' meeting in 2002), 
and, more recently, the stalemate created in 2008 in the 
UfM on the issue of the participation of the Arab League 
and subsequent developments following EP criticism 
of Egypt's human rights' record (see above). The third 
criticism would be that the other two conflicts apart 
from the Middle East, those of Cyprus and the Western 
Sahara, have been side-stepped from the parliamentary 
agenda from the start, a situation which persists until 
now. In the next section we review in more detail these 
three conflicts and how they impact on the parliamen-
tary diplomacy of the EMPA. 
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2.2. The Middle East 
Clearly, it would be a pity -and a great opportunity 
lost- for the Assembly to be bogged down by a discus-
sion of the Middle East Conflict. But then it is odd that a 
Parliamentary Assembly intended to strengthen North-
South bonds in the Mediterranean should engage in 
«small talk» at the expense of the more serious discus-
sion of the real threats to peace and stability in the re-
gion. The treatment of the Middle East problem within 
the EMPA may bear an acute resemblance with a case of 
trying to «run with the hare and hunt with the hounds». 
If the issue is prioritised it paralyses all other work in 
the Assembly; if it is side-tracked, the Assembly is justly 
criticised as a sham. 
Hence, for example, in the priorities which the Hel-
lenic Parliament had set itself for the duration of its 
March 2007-March 2008 tenure of the EMPA Presiden-
cy, the Middle East problem was only placed in seventh 
place, after other topics such as «the dialogue between 
cultures», environmental and climate protection, ener-
gy and migration. This was not a case of misplaced pri-
orities. It reflected the prevalent mood in the assembly. 
Indeed, the Hellenic EMPA Presidency proposed as the 
first point of discussion in the Political Affairs Commit-
tee «Ways for the Parliaments to contribute to the settle-
ment of the Arab-Israeli conflict» 58. 
The fact that the Middle East Conflict featured so 
low in the list of priorities may be a sign that the EMPA 
sees it as having a disruptive impact on a broader dia-
logue on a number of other important issues. A working 
group on peace and security in the Middle East was es-
tablished in March 2007 which by July had gained rec-
58 See «Items of the Committees» on the Greek Presidency web-
site: http://empa.parliament.gr/(accessed 12.10.07). 
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ognition within the EMPA as a parliamentary approach 
to help resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. By the March 
2008 Athens EMPA meeting the group was already 
steadily on its feet. 
When the European Parliament assumed the Presi-
dency of the Assembly in March 2008, it put the Middle 
East process at the top of its priorities stating: 
«1. [The] Peace process in the Middle East: the 
EMPA should contribute to political dialogue in the re-
gion, to enhance the implementation of the road map 
and international law. The Bureau could become directly 
involved by organizing regular exchanges of views with 
Speakers of the Parliaments of the parties at stake and 
with other relevant actors (The Quartet, the Quartet's 
representative, SG of the League of Arab States, etc.). On 
a case by case basis, these meetings could be opened to 
all Committee chairs and to rapporteurs should a topic 
of interest for their work be addressed». 
At the extraordinary EMPA plenary which met in Jor-
dan in October 2008, work was divided almost equally 
between a discussion of the EMPA as the parliamentary 
dimension of the «Union for the Mediterranean» and 
the Middle East Conflict; and at the Brussels plenary of 
March 2009 a recommendation tabled by the Political 
Affairs Committee and approved by the Assembly fo-
cused exclusively on the Middle East Conflict and the sit-
uation in Gaza at the time when there was stalemate in 
the Peace Process. Hence, it can be concluded that from 
2007 onwards the EMPA began to focus more on the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and to give it more open and official 
centre stage. This shift in emphasis also happened at a 
time when the United States was pursuing the Annapolis 
Initiative, which introduced an element of «competitive 
interest» in the formula: the EMPA wanted to avoid all 
possible criticism that the Mediterranean's most august 
parliamentary institution was standing helplessly by 
while Washington ran the «Middle East show». But when 
the conflict in Gaza suddenly erupted towards the end of 
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2008, both the work of the EMPA and the UfM, which 
had been officially launched that year (Paris Summit 
and the Marseilles Ministerial) were disrupted and the 
EMPA only just managed to issue a statement on Gaza 
and to hold an ordinary meeting session in Brussels on 
the 29 January 2009 which decided to send a high level 
fact finding mission to Israel and Gaza. The disruption 
was caused bv the decision of the Bureau of the Parlia-
o 
mentary Assembly of the Islamic Conference, acting on 
behalf of the Arab Group in the EMPA, to suspend its 
involvement in the EMPA. The EMPA committees were 
able to resume their work in mid-February 2009 59. 
But the impasse in the UfM persisted beyond that 
date. Here the Arab member states -with Egypt as the 
co-Chair- asked for a suspension of the UfM institu-
tions and various ministerial meetings including the 
crucial one involving the Union's foreign ministers were 
suspended several times. At the start of March 2010, the 
UfM Secretariat was officially inaugurated in Barcelona 
with Jordanian Ahmad Masadeh appointed as secretary 
general. The Spanish EU Presidency planned to organ-
ize an UfM summit on 7 June 2010 in Barcelona, which, 
due to a number of issues, and in particular the pres-
ence of Israeli foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman, was 
postponed to November, and eventually canceled. 
Notwithstanding that the Middle East conflict has 
gradually worked its way up the ladder from one of a 
number of issues to the forefront of the EMPA agenda, 
the discussion of the conflict has paradoxically monop-
olized most of the debate throughout the lifetime of the 
EMPA and has obstructed progress on many issues dis-
cussed in the various committees, at times even threat-
ening the very functioning of the EMPA itself. 
59 Closing speech by the President of the EP/EMPA, Hans-Gert 
Pottering at the fifth ordinary plenary session of the EMPA held in 
Brussels in March 2009. 
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Paradoxically, while under the EP presidency of 
Hans-Gert Pottering, the EMPA had prioritized the Mid-
dle East conflict, under the Jordanian Presidency which 
began in March 2010 and which will last until March 
2011, the pendulum seems to have shifted away from 
the Middle East Conflict; and the last recommendation 
of the Political Committee approved at the March 2010 
EMPA plenary in Jordan referred to the role of the VfM 
in the Mediterranean region and freedom of expression, 
of religion and belief. This is quite earth-shattering con-
sidering that at the time when the plenary was taking 
place, the impasse in the peace process, Israeli policy 
to allow new settlements in East Jerusalem and excava-
tions around the Temple Mount had strengthened spec-
ulation that yet another Palestinian Intifada was on the 
verge of exploding. 
2.3. Cyprus 
On the contrary, the long standing Cyprus Problem 
remains totally side-lined in the EMPA, notwithstand-
ing that it was mentioned in the 2004 Athens Plenary 
Declaration. There is no reference whatsoever to that 
particular conflict in any of the Final Declarations or 
other major EMPA documents since. 
In the report on the activities of the third EMPA 
Committee presented in Cairo in 2005, it is written that 
the Turkish delegation had «asked for the deletion» of 
a reference to Cyprus «as there was no need to discuss 
this issue in the session» 60. 
In the record of the Proceedings it is stated that: 
«The Cypriot Representative wondered why Turkey 
had asked to delete the paragraph on Cyprus, pointing 
60 First session of the EMPAIPremiere session de I'APEM, Cairo, 
March 2005, p. 33. 
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out that a large part of his country is occupied by Turkey. 
He asked for keeping that paragraph which called for the 
respect and promotion of human rights in Cyprus» 61. 
This situation is not new and reflects a long-standing 
~ ~ 
effort by the Turkish parliamentary delegation to deflect 
any potential criticism of its continued occupation with-
in the EMPA framework. In fact, as early as the initial 
parliamentarisation of EU-Mediterraneanean relations, 
known as the Parliamentary Forum, a similar incident 
had taken place when an addendum by the Cypriot del-
egation complaining that the Forum Final Declaration 
does not refer to the Cyprus Problem because of «the 
objection of the Turkish delegation (oo.) despite repeated 
calls by several members» 62. 
There was no reference to Cyprus in the 2005 Cai-
ro Final Declaration but in a Resolution tabled by the 
Committee on Political Affairs, Human Rights and Se-
curity «On the Assessment of the Barcelona Process on 
the Eve of its Tenth Anniversary», the EMPA instructed 
the said committee to monitor -among other things-
«other political problems pertaining to security and 
neighbourhood between partner countries, including 
the Cyprus issue» 63. 
The fact that there was no direct reference to the is-
sue but just a mention as one of the many problems in 
the Mediterranean confirms this lack of attention to the 
Cyprus Problem. What is also pertinent to point out is 
that the EMPA despite its vast number of parliamen-
tarians -then 260, now 280 in all- finds it difficult to 
attend to other conflicts other than the Arab-Israeli one 
such as those in Cyprus and the Western Sahara. 
61 Ibid., p. 35. 
62 Stavridis, «The Parliamentary Forum of the Euro-Mediterra-
nean Partnership: an assessment», Mediterranean Politics, op. cit., 
p.33. 
63 First session of the EMPAlPremiere session de l'APEM (2005), 
op. cit., p. 64 (emphasis added). 
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The only reference to the Cyprus conflict during the 
2004 Inaugural Plenary Session in Athens needs also to 
be contextualized. It happened during the weeks prior 
to the 24 April 2004 double referendum on the Annan 
Plan in Cyprus, and prior to the Republic of Cyprus' ac-
cession to the EU on 1 May 2004. The expectation then 
was that there would be a solution to the Cyprus Prob-
lem and that a reunified Island would join the Union. 
No doubt, there was a lot of «wishful thinking» in what 
was called the «catalytic impact of membership». Most 
of it was not related to the intricasies of the Annan Plan 
itself. As there was no debate on the issue in the Eu-
ropean Parliament, there was no debate in the EMPA 
Plenary either. To say the least, one can express aston-
ishement at not seeing any debate over such an issue, 
especially among parliamentarians 64. 
Such an attitude towards the Cyprus Problem is 
strange, to put it mildly, because Cyprus is a member 
of the EU, part of its territory is illegally occupied by a 
candidate state to EU membership and a fully-fledged 
participant in the EMPA, and the reverberations from 
the conflict periodically produce important problems 
within the EU itself. 
Finally, beyond the scope of the current study, one 
cannot but ask the question of whether it is so because 
Cyprus is «small meat» when compared to the more 
ominous challenges the Union faces? But one should be 
careful that even «smaller» problems (and their lack of 
a solution) can develop into bigger ones, especially for a 
Union that claims to be an international actor. 
64 For more, see Stavridis, La Uni6n Europea y el conflicto chip-
nota (1974-2006), op. cit., 119-146; Stavridis, Tsardanidis, «The Cy-
prus Problem in the European Parliament: a case of successful or su-
perficial Europeanisation?», European Foreign Affairs Review, op. cit., 
2009. 
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2.4. The Western Sahara 
At the first session of the EMPA held in Cairo in 2005, 
a resolution was approved that referred comprehensively 
to the issues involved in the process and instructed its Po-
litical Committee to monitor the situation in the Middle 
East and in Cyprus, but the Western Sahara problem was 
side-stepped never to feature again 65. The exclusion of this 
conflict, which has bedevilled the politics of the Maghreb 
for so long, fatally wounding the Arab Maghreb Union 66, 
is very hard to explain. Developments on the issue during 
2007-2008 have not stirred the EMPA into action, at least 
visibly. In April 2007 the UN Security Council approved a 
resolution on the situation in the Western Sahara 67. 
Contacts later resumed between all the affected par-
ties, primarily involving Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria 
and the POLISARIO and on 1 October 2007, Morocco's 
Minister of Foreign Affairs signalled to the UN General 
Assembly the possibility of a way out of this quagmire, 
citing the Moroccan Statute of Autonomy for the former 
Spanish Sahara as a «realistic, applicable and final po-
litical solution to a regional dispute that hinders the 
construction of a strong and homogeneous Maghreb, 
interacting with its geopolitical environment» 68. 
65 Resolution of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assem-
bly on the assessment of the Barcelona Process on the eve of its tenth 
anniversary adopted on 15 March 2005 in Cairo: www.europarl.eu-
ropa.eu/intcoop/empa/committee poli/final resolution cair02005 
en.pdf (accessed 11.10.07). 
66 See for instance, Francis Ghiles, «El Magreb paga el precio 
de su desuni6n. El cierre de la Frontera entre Argelia y Marruecos es 
un disparate. Los magrebies no tienen otra alternativa que abrir las 
fronteras que les separan y fomentar la libre circulaci6n de personas, 
mercancias y energia», El Pais,S June 2008. 
67 Security Council Resolution adopted at the SC's 5669th meet-
ing, 30 April 2007, S/RESI1754 (2007). 
68 Statement by HE Mohamed Benaissa, Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs and Co-operation of the Kingdom of Morocco to the 62nd Ses-
sion of the UN General Assembly, New York, 1 October 2007. 
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Algeria augurs a solution to the conflict and hopes 
the people of the territory will be able to vote in a «self-
determination» referendum. The European Parliament 
has meanwhile frequently condemned human rights 
violations in the Western Sahara. But the EMPA seems 
to remain blissfully ignorant of a conflict that is at the 
very core of its raison d'etre at a time when new devel-
opments may require the EMPA's encouragement and 
involvement. 
Thus, the March 2008 Final Declaration of the Ath-
ens Fourth Plenary Session does not mention the con-
flict in the Western Sahara at all, nor does the Final Dec-
laration adopted in Jordan in October 2008. The same 
is true of the 2009 and 2010 sessions. This is happening 
despite the fact that there is an impasse in the disputed 
region over the holding of a referendum on the future 
of the territory annexed by Morocco, an issue which 
also continues to poison relations between Algeria and 
Morocco and obstructs any progress that can be made 
on Maghrebi integration. The UN Security Council has 
extended the presence of the some 225-strong UN per-
sonnel mission in the Western Sahara to April 2011. 
Questions related to the suppression of human rights by 
the Moroccan authorities have been raised in the Euro-
pean Parliament particularly in respect of the Aminatou 
Haidar case. Haidar is one of several Saharawi human 
rights defenders who have been allegedly detained and 
tortured by the Moroccan authorities. Notwithstanding 
this and the importance which the EU accords to its ex-
ternal relations, the Commission did not feel that such 
violations do not merit the suspension of Morocco's Ad-
vanced Status agreement with the EU because it does 
not serve the interests of the EU 69. 
69 Answer given to an EP Question by Commissioner Ferrero-
Waldner on behalf of the Commission, 9 February, 2010, E-6344/ 
2009. 
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3. CONCLUSIONS 
Our argument in this chapter can be summed up as 
follows: 
First, the EMPA has monopolized its interest in con-
flict resolution solely on the Palestinian issue, even if 
initially it did not appear officially high on its agenda. 
In practice the conflict permeated the EMPA agenda at 
various levels usually to block any serious discussion on 
any subject, including the conflict itself. 
Second, the other two conflicts, Cyprus and the 
Western Sahara, were kept off the agenda: the former in 
spite of efforts by (Greek-)Cypriot parliamentarians to 
the contrary and the opposing efforts by Turkish parlia-
mentarians to make sure it stayed off the agenda. Arab 
parliamentarians appear to be on the whole indifferent 
to the Cyprus issue. 
Third, this lack of progress on any of the three con-
flicts is counterproductive because it gives the wrong im-
pression on many accounts: it can be shown as evidence 
that to date, parliamentary diplomacy cannot work; or 
that traditional diplomacy should not be blamed if the 
various problems are so intrinsically complicated to 
solve that even parliamentarians have found their way 
blocked by a brick wall. 
No doubt, one should not blame parliamentary di-
plomacy for failing to solve problems if those problems 
are so difficult to solve that traditional diplomacy has 
not succeeded in doing so either. However, a fair crit-
icism would be if the parliamentary tool is not being 
used properly, in the sense that it has not helped in any 
significant way; or if it has been «abused» for domestic 
petty interests: especially among parliamentarians from 
the Arab countries, who often «play for the gallery», as 
it were. The same is also often true among European 
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counterparts who know they can promise anything, 
criticize as much as they can, knowing very well that 
their respective governments would not budge on any 
set position. As for smaller political groupings who, due 
to the peculiarities of the EP electoral system (second 
order elections, protest vote, proportional representa-
tion), are present in the Parliament in Brussels/Stras-
bourg but often not in their home parliaments, they use 
either «populist» tactics, knowing that since they have 
no power, all they can milk out of EMPA is popularity; 
or, even go as far as to make «irresponsible» statements 
such as the one which points to the need of engaging 
with terrorist organisations -so defined according 
to the ED's own lists to which their countries already 
subscribe- but acting totally with double standards if 
similar arguments are made in their countries (e. g. with 
respect to domestic terrorism). 
It is also true that the whole situation results from a 
number of «structural weaknesses» of the EMPA itself, 
mainly to do with who actually belongs to that institu-
tion: for instance, there is the perennial question about 
the utility of dialogue. For how long does one keep talk-
ing? Is it not better sometimes to make public clear and 
deep divergences of opinion? See for instance the «no 
meeting of minds» in the final declaration of the NATO 
and Southern Mediterranean meeting at Genova on 1 De-
cember 2000 7°. There is also the vexed topic of whether 
the ED is interested in stability or democracy in the Med-
iterranean. To use the words of a Belgian MP during the 
Second Forum (Moriau), one is entitled to argue that «on 
ne biitit pas la democratie avec le deni de democratie». 
Although to date the record of the parliamentary im-
pact on conflict resolution is not that promising, one 
70 NATO Parliamentary Assembly Press Release - Parliamentary 
Debate on Mediterranean Security yields little consensus, Genova, 1 
December 2000, available on the web: www.nato-pa.int/publications/ 
press/pO~ 120 1 a. 
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should be careful not to throw the baby out with the 
bathwater. It remains clear that there is a lot of poten-
tial in employing parliamentary diplomacy for conflict 
resolution, provided that this potential is actually ac-
knowledged and that a conscious effort is made to use 
it. The main test of the efficacy (or otherwise) of par-
liamentary diplomacy in conflict resolution should not 
be the record so far, simply because if it has not been 
employed efficiently to date, then it is axiomatic that 
the results will not be the desired ones. Besides, par-
liamentary diplomacy is an activity which can produce 
results in the long term if it is vigorously pursued over 
time. The continuity (or otherwise) of parliamentarians 
in key parliamentary diplomacy initiatives is therefore 
important. The same is true of how long parliamentari-
ans cover a given foreign policy dossier. The EP has now 
adopted a new measure in its internal rules whereby its 
international delegation members for a given region or 
a given country automatically remain in their post dur-
ing the whole term of the Parliament (five years) and 
no longer only for half the term as it used to be (due to 
a renewal of the President every half term as a result of 
an informal agreement between the two leading politi-
cal groupings in the House). This new rule facilitates at 
least some continuity, even if only in terms of time, in 
the international affairs of the Parliament 71. 
One must also stress that parliamentary diplomacy is 
a very recent phenomenon. Hence, it is not appropriate 
to compare its results with those of traditional diplo-
macy. Nor should one expect that parliamentary diplo-
macy alone can achieve what has not been achieved so 
far by the more traditional diplomatic methods in try-
ing to resolve the Palestinian, Saharawi or Cypriot con-
71 Comments made by Dietmar Nikel during the debates that 
took place at the JORNADA de la Catedra Jean Monnet del Profesor 
Garz6n Clariana: Asamblea Euromediterranea en el marco de la Pre-
sidencia Espanola (Barcelona, 16 April 2010). 
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flicts either. Indeed, parliamentary diplomacy must be 
seen as one of a number of mutually reinforcing efforts 
and activities in international relations aiming to bring 
parties to conflicts closer to one another by increasing 
mutual understanding and access to one another, and 
by creating that environment of trust which is necessary 
to help diplomatic efforts. Hence, parliamentary diplo-
macy must be analysed and judged by (so far not fully 
articulated in the literature) its own set of criteria and 
objectives. For the time being, it is necessary to stress 
that in conflict situations, the stakes are too high, and 
that in such situations there is hardly any choice other 
than to keep on trying. Parliamentary cooperation can 
and should be used as often as possible. Our critique is 
that its main defect to date has been that it has not been 
used to its full potential in trying to resolve any of the 
Mediterranean Region's long standing conflicts. 
The potential «bridge-making» role of parliamentary 
diplomacy in conflict resolution should not be under-
estimated. It is therefore surprising that a 2007 study on 
«Conflict Prevention in the EMP» does not even men-
tion once the potential and actual role that parliaments 
can play in that area 72. 
The numerous conflicts that exist in the region must 
be resolved. In this context, though the EMPA started as 
the parliamentary dimension of the EMP and ought to 
72 Euromesco, «Conflict Prevention in the EMP», Euromesco 
Paper, n.D 64 (Roberto Aliboni, Yasar Qatarneh), September 2007: 
www.euromesco.net.Itis equally relevant to note that the same EU-
ROMESCO Paper does not make a single reference to the Cyprus 
Conflict. We do not expand on the possible reasons for such an omis-
sion but we think any independent-minded observer would note the 
irony that the EUROMESO «experts» survey did not include anyone 
from either Greece or Cyprus, though perhaps not surprisingly (sic) 
one from Turkey was included. This is not unique to EUROMESCO 
of course. For instance there were no representatives from Cyprus 
invited to a meeting on Turkey organized during the Spanish EU Pre-
sidency in April 2010 in Barcelona. 
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remain there, it does not imply that it must stick to the 
EMP agenda. The EMP was originally started to help 
bring about peace, security and a shared prosperity in the 
Mediterranean region; the Middle East problem and the 
other conflicts of the region (Cyprus and the Western Sa-
hara) are the problems to be tackled, not the ones to run 
away from. As long as the main destabilising conflicts per-
sist such as the Middle East, Cyprus and Western Sahara, 
the latter two often and misleadingly labelled the «frozen 
conflicts» 73, it is hard to achieve progress on the «softer» 
issues; issue-linkage politics -whether subtle (covert) or 
open (overt)- connects the two. This is because states 
continue to link progress in one area to progress in the 
other. All the conflicts analyzed here have at one time or 
another been blamed for the lack of progress in regional 
co-operation of various types even when such co-opera-
tion was considered to be of a functional, non-political 
nature or better still was perceived as a sort of longer-
term confidence building process that could lead to posi-
tive spill over into the political domain. 
What seems to be essential is that in regional parlia-
mentary initiatives such as the EMPA, participants are 
constantly reminded of the need to maintain their focus 
on the objectives of such initiative in conflict resolution. 
It is sad that often many national delegations behave 
just as the extension of their countries' diplomatic serv-
ice often turning EMPA meetings into arenas for scoring 
propaganda points or for trying to influence the world 
views of European parliamentarians. It is time to call 
the parliamentarians to order and convince them to fo-
cus more radically on dialogue. 
The absence of pluralistic democracies in the south 
where political parties and members of parliament 
73 One can but only refer to the other so-called «frozen» conflict, 
like the one in Georgia which this summer of 2008 went «hot» at a 
«micro-wave oven» speed, to keep with the analogy. 
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need to maintain contact with constituencies and vot-
ers to stand any chance of re-election is already a seri-
ous handicap. The lack of pressure to be accountable 
to voters leaves southern politicians free from any con-
straint to produce results. In addition there is the prob-
lem of the visibility of the UfM and EMPA itself, the in-
terest shown in them by the public and media. As long 
as both the UfM and the EMPA are not in the vortex 
of the public and media interest, and the recent UfM 
stalemate is an important setback in this respect, what 
happens in them and what the various participants do 
in them (including parliamentarians) will remain irrel-
evant and isolated, taking place in a bubble separated 
from the rest of the world. But should the EMPA be-
come more forthcoming and pro-active on many issues, 
including conflict resolution, then the publics every-
where will become interested in it and what their par-
liamentarians are doing or not doing, given that there 
is near universal desire that existing conflicts ought to 
be resolved once and for all. The guiding star is simple 
and unproblematic: give the parliamentary assembly a 
credible, important role in conflict resolution and the 
public will focus on it thereby increasing its relevance 
and effectiveness. Allow it to languish in the desert of 
irrelevance and trivia, and the public will disregard 
it thereby devaluing it further as an effective political 
force for good. 
It is becoming clear that the further deepening of 
the parliamentarization of the UfM is not perceived in 
good light by a number of participant states which have 
blocked its progress in the last two years. Hence in the 
foreseeable future, the EMPA restricted as it is to a con-
sultative role, and as long as its parliamentarians from 
democratic countries do not lose patience with it and 
abandon it, is left with no alternative but to continue 
to pursue conflict resolution with the tools accessible 
to it. Had EMPA been given more powers it would have 
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been in a better position to playa more crucial role in 
conflict resolution and in reinvigorating the UfM itself 
when this stumbled soon after its birth -the July 2008 
Paris summit. 
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